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I
 have been asked to focus on the pressures and
constraints on monetary officials resulting from
chronically high unemployment.
We all know that unemployment is one of the
biggest problems facing most OECD countries. We
also know that there are strong demands on policy-
makers to provide solutions.
But responsible policymakers must recognize
the limits of the policies they have at their com-
mand. Even with the best of intentions, some policy
approaches have the potential to end up doing more
harm than good. To apply such policies just to be
seen to be doing something would be very irrespon-
sible indeed.
Most economists now accept that there are
clear limits to what monetary policy can do to help
lower unemployment. Monetary policy does have
a clear part to play, and an important one. But it is
not a tool we should use directly to stimulate growth
or employment. Experience has taught us that such
an approach will not work. On the contrary, it can
be very damaging. 
The best contribution monetary policy can
make to growth and employment is to maintain
stability in the general level of prices.
However, the wishful thinking that often under-
lies attempts to use monetary policy to stimulate
activity and employment has not disappeared.
Within public and political circles alike there is still
a belief that monetary policy could do more to
reduce unemployment than simply dealing with
inflation. To those holding that view, focusing
monetary policy upon price stability can appear a
very callous approach.
As you may know, the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand now has a clear and very distinctive man-
date to maintain price stability. You will not be
surprised to learn that people often criticize our
monetary policy framework for not paying ade-
quate attention to unemployment.  Today I would
like to give you some insights into the way this issue
has developed in New Zealand and how the Reserve
Bank has responded. I would also like to explain
why the monetary policy framework in New Zea-
land plays an important role in reducing pressures
on the central bank to influence employment in
ways that will ultimately prove unsuccessful.
Monetary policy: What did the past teach us?
To begin, I think it is useful to review the main
lessons we have learned about the role of monetary
policy over the past two decades. Unless we keep
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At one time or another, governments around the
world have tried to use monetary policy to achieve
almost every conceivable economic objective, and
some social objectives as well. Economic growth
and employment have often been high on the list of
objectives for monetary policy.
New Zealand’s experience over the 1970s and
early 1980s provides as good an example as any of
this shotgun approach to monetary policy. The for-
mer Reserve Bank legislation, in place until 1989,
required that monetary policy be directed toward
enhancing economic and social welfare. In doing
so, attention was to be given to promoting the
highest level of production, trade, and full employ-
ment, and to maintaining a stable price level.
The act did not define these objectives. More-
over, the Reserve Bank was given little operational
independence to achieve them. Legally, the respon-
sibility for monetary policy rested almost entirely
upon the minister of finance. 
Given the multiple goals, and the lack of any
real accountability framework, ministers of finance
faced little discipline in the conduct of monetary
policy. As the theory of political economy might
predict, there was an overriding tendency to use
monetary policy to stimulate the economy. The
fiscal stance over this period was also expansionary,
with large and persistent fiscal deficits.
Despite the expansionary macroeconomic pol-
icy, New Zealand’s growth performance over the
period fell well below the OECD average. The
unemployment rate, which is estimated to have
been as low as 1 percent in the early 1970s, trended
upward to just over 5 percent by the early 1980s.
That upward trend was temporarily broken in
1984, due to a significant further stimulus, and a
reduction in real wages arising from a wage and
price freeze.
The expansionary nature of macroeconomic
policy resulted in high and variable inflation. The
Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased fivefold in
New Zealand between 1970 and 1984. Among the
OECD group of countries, prices over the same
period increased “only” threefold.
New Zealand’s experience over this period
helped to teach us many lessons about the conduct
of monetary policy that other countries have also
learned.
The unemployment-inflation tradeoff
It is clear that we were asking monetary policy
to do things it could not. Stimulating activity
worked for short periods in the sense of increasing
both output and employment. Ultimately, however,
the only enduring result was high inflation.
Monetary stimulation was no safeguard against
unemployment. In economic parlance, there was
no stable, long-run Phillips curve that we could
exploit to help improve economic growth or em-
ployment prospects. 
It is worth recalling that Bill Phillips, a fellow
New Zealander, never claimed that there was an
exploitable policy tradeoff when he originally un-
covered the unemployment-wage relationship. 
It would be misleading to assert that our poor
growth record and the emergence of unemploy-
ment over this period were simply the result of
following inflationary policies. Clearly, other fac-
tors were also at work. Our highly regulated econ-
omy was unable to adjust efficiently to changes in
the global economy. 
But inflation made matters worse. By impeding
the efficient operation of markets over a long pe-
riod, inflation appears to have worsened both
growth and employment prospects. Our lackluster
growth performance would certainly suggest that.
Internationally, of course, there is a growing
body of evidence suggesting that inflation hinders
growth. By implication, it also hinders employ-
ment prospects.
Our experience strongly supports this interna-
tional evidence that monetary policy is best directed
toward a single goal—the maintenance of stability
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contribution monetary policy can make to growth
and employment prospects. 
Central bank structure
New Zealand’s experience can also teach us much
about the appropriate structure of a central bank.
A central bank must be given a clear mandate
to maintain price stability. But it also needs the
operational independence to pursue that goal. With-
out it, political incentives are likely to pressure
governments to direct monetary policy toward real
sector objectives that it cannot sustainably meet. 
But even operational independence is not
enough. In order to ensure the central bank delivers
on the price stability goal, it must also be made fully
accountable for its performance.
Putting the lessons into practice: The New
Zealand monetary policy framework
We have attempted to apply these lessons to the
monetary policy framework in New Zealand. Start-
ing from late 1984, the incoming government di-
rected the central bank to begin reducing inflation.
The government passed a new Reserve Bank Act in
1989 to formalize that objective. The act came into
force in early 1990. The act makes the achievement
and maintenance of price stability in the general
level of prices the only focus of monetary policy.
The act itself does not define “stability in the
general level of prices,” but requires the minister of
finance and me to negotiate a Policy Targets Agree-
ment, or PTA. This defines price stability quantita-
tively. Thus it becomes a clear target to which we
can be held accountable. The current target is for
the maintenance of twelve-monthly consumer price
inflation between 0 and 2 percent. The PTA is
renegotiated whenever a governor is appointed or
reappointed. Both the minister of finance and the
governor must be satisfied that the specific target is
consistent with the act before signing the agreement.
Price stability, as defined, was first achieved in
1991, around seven years after we were first di-
rected to pursue low inflation. We have maintained
inflation within that 0 to 2 percent range ever since.
Many people, in New Zealand and abroad,
were surprised at the passage of the Reserve Bank
Act. They were also intrigued that the act received
unanimous support from both major political parties.
Politicians’ support for the Reserve Bank Act
reflects very considerable political courage on their
part. Implicitly, they have recognized that the long-
term benefits of pursuing price stability outweigh
whatever political benefits there are from using
monetary policy to meet short-term objectives.
Given the continued pressures politicians find
themselves under to do more about unemployment,
and the widespread belief in an inflation/employ-
ment tradeoff, the broad political support for the act
is remarkable indeed.
Pressures on the monetary authorities:
Recent trends in unemployment
Over most of the period during which we were
reducing inflation, the New Zealand economy ex-
perienced a recession in activity. That reflected not
only the influence of disinflation, but also the ad-
justment pressures caused by microeconomic re-
form on a scale probably unprecedented in the
OECD in the last four decades.
At about the time we achieved price stability in
1991, the economy entered a recovery phase and
has continued to strengthen since. Over the year to
March 1994, the economy grew by 5.3 percent. 
The unemployment rate, which continued to
rise during the disinflation period, has fallen from
a seasonally adjusted peak of 10.9 percent in Sep-
tember 1991 to 8.4 percent in June 1994. Total
employment has grown by nearly 4 percent over the
past year.
Most forecasters expect the unemployment rate
to fall further over the next few years as economic
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a rise in the labor force participation rate associated
with growth in job opportunities, are expected to
partly offset the decline in the unemployment rate,
but despite this, we, ourselves, are expecting the
unemployment rate to be around 8 percent by early
next year.
But even 8 percent unemployment is still un-
comfortably high and most New Zealanders, and
indeed most New Zealand policymakers, want to
see it further reduced.
The role of the policy framework
Does the New Zealand monetary policy frame-
work shield the bank from pressures from politi-
cians and others to “do something” about
unemployment? I would like to give an unequivocal
“yes” to that question, but I can’t. You probably
wouldn’t believe me if I did. But the framework
undoubtedly helps to reduce those pressures. 
Our framework is certainly very effective in
discouraging us from diverting from the price sta-
bility objective when implementing monetary pol-
icy. The PTA establishes a clear target against which
I am accountable. If the bank were to succumb to
pressures that jeopardized that target, we would
soon be required to explain why. 
As governor, I am personally accountable for
our monetary policy performance. If we fail to meet
our inflation obligations under the PTA, the act makes
it possible for the minister of finance to dismiss me.
That threat places an important discipline on me not
to target anything other than price stability. 
The process of accountability is carefully for-
malized under the legislation. We are required to
produce monetary policy statements at least once
every six months, explaining our policy actions.
These policy statements mean that our actions are
subject to close scrutiny not only by the govern-
ment, but also by the financial markets and other
interested bodies.
Each monetary policy statement is followed
shortly after by a hearing conducted by the Finance
and Expenditure Committee, a parliamentary com-
mittee consisting of both government and opposi-
tion members—rather like the congressional
committee before which Mr. Greenspan regularly
appears. The committee can ask the bank for further
information about our performance. 
Inevitably, the financial markets are an impor-
tant arbiter of our performance. If our words or
actions suggested we had been pressured, or were
going soft on the inflation target, interest rates could
be expected to rise quickly. That in itself could be
harmful to employment.
Since the passage of the Reserve Bank Act in
1989, indeed since late 1984, there has been no
attempt by any government to influence the imple-
mentation of monetary policy. On occasion, temp-
tation must have been strong. In late 1990, for
example, just before a general election, the bank felt
it necessary to firm monetary conditions to ensure
continued progress toward the price stability goal
in the face of an expansionary fiscal stance. I’m sure
that no government wants that just before an election.
Under a clause in the act, the government has
the power to direct the bank to focus monetary
policy on some objective other than price stability.
However, that instruction has to be in public (by
means of an Order-in-Council), and in most circum-
stances, that makes it politically unattractive.
The public communications function
In the long run, the monetary policy framework
can only survive if people widely support it. Within
the business sector, especially among farmers and
manufacturers, there is growing recognition of the
benefits of price stability. 
Among the general public, support is also
growing. People are beginning to see that it is
possible for stable prices, economic growth, and job
creation to go hand-in-hand, and for more than just
a fleeting period.
However, the policy framework has always
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framework for its exclusive focus on price stability
and argued for a wider mandate that pays more
attention to unemployment. 
Among those to have criticized the framework
have been a former prime minister and leaders of
several of the smaller opposition parties. The Council
of Trade Unions, unemployed workers groups, church
leaders, many academics, and some media and
talk-back hosts have also questioned the framework.
The critics are keen to see the inflation target
diluted, with the bank pursuing some kind of employ-
ment target as well. Implicit in that call is the notion
of a long-run, exploitable, Phillips-type relationship.
Many of the public share that view. In March
of this year, the National Business Review (the most
widely read business weekly in the country) pub-
lished a poll on the Reserve Bank Act. The poll,
known as “The NBR-Consultus Poll,” asked people
if they would support a change to the act to include
the reduction of unemployment as one of the bank’s
objectives.
Sixty-two percent of those polled said they
would support such a change. The remainder was
about equally divided between opposing the change
and being unsure about it. In the same poll, however,
80 percent of those polled admitted to knowing
“hardly anything” or “not that much” about the
existing act.
One of the bank’s most important functions has
therefore been to try and build a wider constituency
for the price stability objective. Most people can
accept that inflation imposes significant costs on the
economy and society. But people also need to be
convinced that attempting to trade off just a little
more inflation for a little less unemployment, how-
ever tempting, just isn’t a workable proposition.
Since the late 1980s, the bank has operated a
very active public communications program. We
undertake a substantial program of speeches and
presentations for a wide variety of public groups.
The bank also briefs politicians and members of the
media on the policy framework. 
When presented with the facts, most people are
prepared to at least consider the merits of our
monetary policy approach. And there are many
compelling facts that we can point out to people in
those presentations.
The first is that unemployment in New Zealand
had become a deep-seated problem long before we
embarked on the price stability goal, despite a sus-
tained period of monetary stimulation. Clearly,
structural factors outside the ambit of monetary
policy were at work.
We can also highlight the international expe-
rience pointing to the absence of an inflation-
employment tradeoff or a long-run Phillips curve.
And we can cite the growing body of empirical
evidence that suggests inflation is actually harmful
to growth. The high degree of international agree-
ment on these issues is strong support for our mone-
tary policy approach.
Building support for the policy framework has
been no easy task. Nor can we claim to have finished
that task.
Our public communications role needed to be-
gin while inflation was being brought down.
Throughout that period, unemployment was rising
steadily, partly reflecting the disinflationary pres-
sure needed to lower inflation. 
In those circumstances, the message that price
stability would be beneficial to growth and employ-
ment was bound to meet with resistance. The public
made its own assessment of the costs of disinflation.
Having made that assessment, people could easily
believe that price stability, once achieved, would
also be costly.
The bank has always acknowledged openly that
disinflation involved employment costs. We also
note that it is difficult to quantify those costs given
all the other influences on unemployment at that
time. A key message in our speeches during disin-
flation was that the employment consequences
would be reduced, the sooner wage and price setters
realized that we were absolutely committed to low-
ering inflation.
Among the economics profession and else-
where, there is still considerable debate on the costs
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whole hog” are worth incurring. For New Zealand,
those costs, whatever they were, have now been
incurred.
The bank, therefore, stresses to people that
forsaking price stability now would at some point
require those costs to be paid again, unless we were
prepared to tolerate high inflation indefinitely.
Clearly, the higher one assesses the costs of disin-
flation, the less attractive a return to high inflation
becomes.
Public support for price stability has not been
helped by the silence, and sometimes the outright
criticism, of some of the major beneficiaries of price
stability. Their criticisms, while often unrelated to
unemployment, have reinforced the idea among
some people that price stability has very few benefits.
To illustrate: During the high inflation era of the
1970s and 1980s, real, post-tax interest rates on
savings were typically negative. As in most other
countries, savers in New Zealand pay tax on their
entire nominal interest earnings, not just the real
component.
As inflation has fallen, real, after-tax returns
have improved. But people have suffered from
money illusion. As nominal interest rates have
fallen, savers have commonly perceived them-
selves to be worse off than under high inflation.
Many of those on interest incomes, such as the
retired, have been vocal critics of price stability.
Their confusion has certainly not helped public
support for price stability.
Unemployment and monetary policy: 
Some common issues 
Apart from those critics who still hold to a
rather simplistic Phillips-curve view of the world,
there are three other strands of criticism surrounding
the monetary policy framework in New Zealand.
First, some critics argue that the bank achieved
price stability too early, and as a result, incurred
unnecessary costs in terms of output and unemploy-
ment. The original PTA required us to achieve price
stability by 1992. At the end of 1990, this deadline
was changed to 1993. In fact, we achieved a 1
percent rate of headline inflation (and a 1.7 percent
rate of underlying inflation) in 1991. The bank has
openly acknowledged that we did get to our target
earlier than intended and that that may have resulted
in additional costs. But that conclusion is by no
means clear. Recent work by writers such as
Laurence Ball and others suggests that the optimal
speed of disinflation may actually have been faster
than the seven years we took. A case can therefore
be made that by getting there a little early, we
avoided some of the employment costs which
would have been involved by a still more prolonged
disinflation. The jury is still out on this issue.
Second, some critics hold that employment
prospects could be improved if only the Reserve
Bank were prepared to tolerate a lower New Zealand
dollar. Since a lower exchange rate would, it is
argued, enhance the competitiveness of exporters
and import substituting industries, activity and em-
ployment would be enhanced also. This is, of course,
an open economy variation on the familiar argument
that monetary policy is capable of a sustained stimu-
lative effect on employment and growth.
Given New Zealand’s relatively open econ-
omy, the nominal exchange rate is clearly an impor-
tant influence on the inflation outlook. The bank has
been quite open in stating that it must hold a view
on the exchange rate that is consistent with price
stability. That view is made with reference to the
many other factors feeding into the inflation pro-
cess. While, in practice, we can often tolerate quite
wide fluctuations in the exchange rate, we cannot
be indifferent to its moving beyond those limits.
Our ability to influence the nominal exchange
rate means that we can certainly affect the real
exchange rate in the short term. But economic
theory and our own experience tell us that attempts
to drive the real exchange rate down will be suc-
cessful for only as long as it takes people to realize
the inflationary consequences of a lower nominal
exchange rate. In other words, our capacity to bene-
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to our capacity to fool people, or for however long
it takes for sticky prices to change.
Historically, depreciations in the New Zealand
dollar have simply reflected relative price changes
between New Zealand and its trading partners due
to inflation. A depreciating dollar has not been
associated with sustained improvements in our real
exchange rate. For example, over the 20 years from
1970 to 1990, the Zealand dollar depreciated (on
a trade-weighted basis) by just over 50 percent.
Over this period, prices in New Zealand rose by
just over twice as much as those in our major
trading partners.
A third concern of critics relates to the defini-
tion of the price stability target itself. Price stability
is defined in the PTA as consistent with year-on-
year increases in the CPI of 0-2 percent. It is some-
times held that the 0-2 percent definition is either
“too low,” “too narrow,” or both. Maintaining the
target is said to be unnecessarily costly in terms of
output and employment.
Is the inflation target centered around “too low”
a midpoint? We don’t believe so. Over the three-
and-a-half-year period during which inflation has
been maintained within the target, the economy has
entered a sustained growth phase. This is hardly
convincing evidence that we have impeded growth
or employment. 
As best we can tell, the center of the target—1
percent—appears to correspond to genuine price
stability once the various sources of bias in the CPI
are allowed for. In the bank’s view, there should be
no ongoing employment costs of maintaining that
target, provided wage and price setters are confident
that we will, on average, deliver that outcome and
adapt their behavior to that reality.
It is sometimes posited, by Lawrence Summers
for example, that some low, positive target rate of
inflation is more appropriate than price stability so
that real wages are able to fall over the economic
cycle if required. Downward nominal wage rigidity
is seen to limit real wage adjustment when inflation
is zero. 
As I have argued elsewhere, with price stability,
nominal wages are likely to grow at the trend rate
of productivity growth over the business cycle so
that real wage movements are able to fall below
trend without nominal wage cuts. It simply requires
forgoing some of the nominal wage increase that
would otherwise occur due to productivity increases.
Moreover, nominal wage stickiness, where it
exists, is surely a feature of an individual’s employ-
ment contract. It is much less likely to apply in an
average sense. Most firms are able to reduce the
average nominal wage without having to cut the
wage of any incumbent employee. The replacement
of highly paid retirees and resignees with lower-
paid recruits, and a reduction in the remuneration
steps that accompany promotions, are all ways of
capping or reducing the nominal wage bill without
resorting to outright pay cuts.
Those supporting a wider target band often
point to a potential instrument instability problem
under the current target. Because of the imprecise
nature of the monetary policy tools at our disposal,
they say policy adjustments may become erratic as
we attempt to keep from over- or undershooting the
target. Accordingly, monetary policy may cause
unnecessary gyrations in economic activity, per-
haps to the detriment of employment. 
Moreover, it is argued that, under a narrow
target, the Reserve Bank may often be forced to act
before it has sufficient information on the outlook
for inflation. Thus inappropriate policy actions may
be taken because inflationary movements will often
be misread. 
Is the current price stability target too narrow?
On the evidence to date, I would have to say no. The
bank has successfully maintained inflation within
the 0-2 percent range since 1991. During that time
we have not been led to make frequent or erratic
adjustments to policy settings. I readily concede,
however, that the framework is still young. It is yet
to be tested over a full economic cycle.
It appears to me that widening the target so that
we wait longer before adjusting policy is an argu-
ment that can easily be overdone. There is a long
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fore acting when inflation emerges. As a result, the
costs of correction have often been accentuated. A
target that limits the scope for policy adjustments to
be deferred can thus actually minimize the resulting
costs of correction. 
I should also mention that a clause within the
PTA recognizes explicitly that it may not be appro-
priate to contain the CPI inflation rate within the 0-2
percent target at all times. That clause recognizes
that when certain shocks beyond the direct control
of policy occur, it may not be worth incurring the
output and employment costs of trying to offset them.
These shocks include large terms of trade
movements, and changes in indirect taxes and gov-
ernment charges. In addition, interest rates are mea-
sured directly in New Zealand’s CPI. A significant
movement in interest rates may thus provide
grounds for allowing the inflation rate to move
outside the 0-2 percent range. (To do otherwise
would, of course, create an absurdity: a tightening
in policy that led to an increase in interest rates
would increase measured inflation and provoke a
further tightening in policy, and so on.)
We are, of course, expected to account for and
explain cases where headline inflation does tempo-
rarily leave the range. The presumption is that we
will meet the target most of the time. 
Inflation expectations and policy credibility
could both be seriously damaged from the move to
a wider target or if the target was shifted upward.
Those in the financial markets could conclude that
the real aiming point for inflation had become the
upper portion of the new target. That perception
could complicate the maintenance of price stability.
And interest rates would almost certainly rise in
response to higher expected inflation. That would
do nothing to help employment.
From my comments, it should be clear that I am
not by any means persuaded of the merits of a
change to the target: at a technical level, the issue is
relatively minor, but the likely change in percep-
tions caused by a widening of the target range could
well damage growth and employment rather than
the reverse.
Concluding comments
Little did Bill Phillips know, when he uncov-
ered his unemployment-wage relationship, of the
unfortunate effect his discovery would have on the
conduct of monetary policy for decades afterward.
It is rather ironic, given Phillips’ own view that the
relationship was of little policy relevance. With
many having been brought up on the Phillips curve,
there are always likely to be pressures on monetary
authorities to tolerate just a little more inflation to
help unemployment. New Zealand’s monetary pol-
icy framework plays an important role in shielding
us from that temptation.
Reducing unemployment is now the most im-
portant economic and social objective in many
OECD economies. People understandably ask what
the monetary authority can do to help. By aiming
monetary policy squarely at maintaining price sta-
bility, there is much we can do.
By aiming monetary policy elsewhere, we
would not only damage the economy and its capac-
ity to generate sustainable employment, we would
also distract attention away from where the real
solutions to unemployment lie—in labor market
reform, in training and retraining, and in the reform
of the relationship between wages and benefits.
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